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Since their inception in the 1950s, Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) have dramaticaly
expanded with the purpose of investing government revenue and maximiing returns for states
with surplus funds. While SWF investments benefit their sovereign owners and can bring
stability and growth to the economies the) invest in, concerns about the use of investments for
political gains and about the defense of national security have led to calls for regulation of SWF
investment worldwide. But rather than entangle these investments in a series of varied and
complex domestic law solutions, this Comment argues that SWF investment can be effectivey
monitored through international arbitration. If SWFs are held accountable in international
arbitration, they will increasingly behave as private investors and politicaly motivated investing
will be more easily identified and prevented. The International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) provides just the forum for resolution of disputes regarding
SWF investments. Through ICSID arbitration, international standards can be developed and
enforced to protect commercially minded investing and to condemn politicaly motivated
investing.
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I. INTEGRATING A NEW CLASS OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTORS
In an economic climate defined by the passage of Dodd-Frank' and
drastically increased spending on monitoring and enforcement in the financial
sector, regulation has become an expected and accepted tool of national
governments to sustain and protect the economy. However, regulation is not
always the most effective means of stabilizing or stimulating investment. Rather
than deter foreign investors like Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) with the threat
of increased and uncertain regulation, nations should rely on a well-established
alternative dispute resolution body such as the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (CSID) to monitor and enforce accepted
practices of foreign investors.
SWFs are a diverse class of investors. Some are familiar and accessible,
such as the Alaska Permanent Fund, established by the state constitution and
managed by the Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation with legislative oversight
to invest the profits from mineral leases and sales and pay out dividends to
I Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L No 111-203, 124 Stat 1376
(2010).
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Alaska residents.2 Others, like the China Investment Corporation (CIC), are
relatively new investors seeking to invest government surpluses, but less
transparent in their investments and subject to considerable skepticism about
their possible political motivations.3 The difference between these two types of
investors is the center of much regulatory debate. Host states want to encourage
an influx of capital from commercially-minded SW~s while discouraging
political investments from others.
Scholars and international institutions have struggled to produce a single
definition of SWFs that can encapsulate their multifariousness: "All in all, SWFs
are 'private sovereign entities' (entities with sovereign owners operating in
private sectors)."' Beyond that, their investment strategies, size, activities, and
purposes differ considerably. SWFs move trillions of dollars through the global
markets and invested nearly $40 billion in American financial institutions in 2007
alone.6 Discussions have even extended to whether the US should create its own
national SWF.7 But as a result of the diversity and recent rapid growth of SWFs,
the international community has not developed effective investment regulations
and dispute resolution options.
SWFs also pose a unique national security challenge for policymakers due
to concerns about their legitimacy and integrity as investors. SWFs could
potentially be used to promote the political goals of their sovereign owners and
threaten the political and economic security of the states in which they invest.
For example, significant investments by the Abu Dhabi fund in the US threaten
American policymakers' "future ability to oppose Abu Dhabi on matters related
to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, terrorism or military concerns, or other
diplomatic efforts" for fear of economic retaliation.' Some have also expressed a
fear that these investments could give sovereigns access to sensitive security
information of the host state in the infrastructure, energy, and technology
sectors. As a result of these and similar investments, there has been a push to
2 Alaska Stat § 37.13.010. See also Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation, online at
http://www.apfc.org/home/Content/home/index.cfm (visited Oct 12, 2012).
3 China Investment an Open Book?, CBS News (Feb 11, 2009), online at http://www.cbsnews.com/
2100-18560_162-3993933.html?tag=contentMain;contentBody (visited Oct 12, 2012).
4 Fabio Bassan, The Law ofSovenrign Wealth Funds 24 (Edward Elgar 2011).
5 Richard A. Epstein and Amanda M. Rose, The Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Virtues of
Going Slow, 76 U Chi L Rev 111, 115 (2009).
6 Paul Rose, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Active or Passive Investors? 118 Yale L J Pocket Part 104 (2008).
7 Landon Thomas Jr., A U.S. Step Toward State-Run Investments, NY Times C9 (Sept 23, 2008).
8 Victor Fleischer, A Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth, 84 NYU L Rev 440, 513 (2009).
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regulate SWFs through domestic law.9 There is international pressure for more
transparency and accountability of SWFs,o in the belief that forcing more
disclosure will root out political investments.
These concerns have been challenged in some studies that indicate "there
is no difference between the investments of SWFs and mutual funds in terms of
political regime or corporate governance. This reinforces the finding that
sovereign wealth funds are in fact more oriented towards risk-return and profit-
maximisation objectives than commonly held."" After initial skepticism toward
SWFs, now many argue that SWFs should not be singled out and treated
differently from other investments.12 Yet some still maintain that "the evidence
suggests SWFs would pay a heavy premium for political gains" and calls for
regulation of all investors have not ceased. 3 This debate will extend beyond
policymakers' attempts to identify political motives to litigators and arbitrators
who seek to determine the correct forum and procedures for SWF dispute
resolution, which would promote investment while preventing these investments
from becoming political leverage and circumventing diplomacy.
Regulators must weigh the risk that SWFs will use investments as political
leverage or will push private investors out because they are willing to pay a
premium price for the non-monetary benefits of their investments against the
potential benefit of opening the host state's markets to a significant amount of
capital. These debates routinely play out in international forums as they involve
competing conceptions of capitalism and sovereignty. Though SWFs have been
often debated in terms of additional domestic regulatory measures, it is time to
recognize that there is a large role for international law to play and much room
for it to develop in regulation and dispute resolution. First, rather than assume
that this group of investors requires tailor-made laws and regulations, states
should look to the mechanisms already available in international investment law
and to the benefit of integrating SWFs into the existing system. Second, there is
9 See, for example, Benjamin J. Cohen, Sovereign Wealth Funds and NaionalSecurity: The Great Tradeoff
85 Intl Aff 713 (2009).
10 Monetary and Capital Markets and Policy Development and Review Departments of the
International Monetary Fund, Sovereign Wealth Funds-A Work Agenda 15-16, International
Monetary Fund (IMF) (Feb 29, 2008), online at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/
eng/2008/022908.pdf (visited Oct 12, 2012).
11 Rolando Avendaio and Javier Santiso, Are Sovereign Wealth Fund Investments Po tcall Biased?
Comparing Mutual and Sovereign Funds, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) Development Centre (Jan 2010), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1544496 (visited
Oct 12, 2012).
12 David Murray, SWFs: Myths and Realties 3 (Keynote Address London, May 5, 2011) ("[I]t is not
the case that as a group, they are different from other commercially-focused investors.").
13 Rose, Sovereign Wealth Funds at 108 n 13 (cited in note 6).
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a growing need to identify comprehensive dispute resolution mechanisms
against or available to SWFs and determine the extent to which these should
recognize the unique and potentially politically-charged nature of SWFs or treat
them as any other private investor. These issues are not going away; "[i]n the
United States alone, there have been more than 200 reported court cases filed
against foreign sovereigns since 2004," raising issues of sovereignty and
attachability, national security, and efficiency."
This Comment seeks to analyze SWFs from a dispute resolution
perspective advocating a regime that will minimize the potential for important
stabilizing capital to be invested toward political ends. This regime would
recognize that encouraging political investments between sovereigns privileges
wealth in politics above all else and undermines diplomatic efforts, but would
avoid imposing a cumbersome regulatory mechanism. Global investments will
help link national economies and align the motives of different sovereignties, but
host states will still be able to guard against Trojan horse investments 5 since
"foreign sovereigns are not committed to acting only according to economic
motives.
Identifying the appropriate forum and mechanics of potential arbitration of
investment disputes against and by SWFs can assist in depoliticizing SWF
investments and significantly reduce the need for regulation. When host states
demonstrate a willingness to pursue neutral international dispute resolution in a
highly-publicized arena against SWFs, their receipt of SWF funds will be
recognized as nothing but a commercial transaction whose terms will be
enforced and monitored like any other investor. Leveling the playing field will
also make political side deals easier to identify against a backdrop of predictable
investment behavior. ICSID offers one such forum for contracting states that
consent to arbitration. ICSID arbitration tribunals avoid some of the domestic
law issues of neutrality, sovereignty and enforcement and take advantage of
14 George K. Foster, Collecting from Soverigns: The Current Legal Framework for Enfordng ArbitralAwards
and Courtjudgments Against States and Their Instrumentaities, and Some Proposals for Its Refomn, 25 Ariz J
Intl & Comp L 666, 667 (2008).
15 Trojan horse investment strategies, employed most notably by China, seek to achieve political
ends under the guise of being profit-maximizing investments to avoid raising questions by host
state regulators. See, for example, Nasos Mihalaks, Chinese Trojan Horse L-Investing in Greece, or
Invading Europe? (Part I) (Foreign Policy Association Jan 15, 2011), online at
http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2011/01/15/chinese-/oE2%80/ 98trojan-horse/oE2%80%99-
investing-in-greece-or-invading-europe-part-i/ (visited Oct 12, 2012) (perhaps overstating the
problem as: "The Chinese government has been making all kind[s] of business acquisitions
throughout the world; from oil and mineral rights deals in Africa, to the purchase of car
manufacturing companies in Europe and the U.S. Everything the Chinese government does
commercially on the international[] stage is part of a larger strategy with a broader objective.").
16 Fleischer, 84 NYU L Rev at 483-84 (cited in note 8).
Winter 2013 653
Chicago Journal of International Law
preexisting international agreements. This Comment also seeks to explore some
of the alternatives to ICSID arbitration, most saliently US litigation, to highlight
the advantages or disadvantages of each forum.
To this end, the Comment will be structured as follows: Section II
examines the current legal structure of SWFs including their origin, how they are
defined, applicable investment law, and the recent Santiago Principles. Section
III takes a closer look at ICSID as a possible venue for SWF arbitration by
elucidating its origin, jurisdiction, and current function. Section IV addresses the
viability of arbitration involving SWFs in ICSID and the potential impact on
SWF investing. Section V offers alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to
ICSID arbitration for SWFs. Finally, Section VI concludes with projections
about the relationship between ICSID and SWFs.
II. CURRENT LEGAL STRUCTURE OF SWFs
A. Origin
SWFs are a diverse group of investors that employ different investment
strategies and arise out of different countries' circumstances." The first SWFs
arose in the 1950s, when the Kuwait Investment authority and the Kiribati
Revenue Equalisation Reserve Fund were established to invest surplus
government funds." Historically, they have reduced export product price
fluctuations and facilitated distribution of raw material price increases,
benefitting international institutions.'9 These benefits, the absence of harmful
effects, and the relative unpopularity of SWFs meant that they were largely
ignored.
After fifty years of existence, SWFs attracted attention. In 2005, the term
"Sovereign Wealth Fund" was coined.2 0 By this time there had been "spectacular
growth in official sector assets all over the world," a new Korean fund was
established, and an aggregate total asset pool of at least $895 billion raised
eyebrows.2 Also in 2005, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation bid on
17 Murray, SWFs. Myths and Realities at 4 (cited in note 12).
18 Mathias Audit, Is the Erecting of Barriers Against Foreign Sovereign Wealth Funds Compatible aith
International Investment Law 1 (Society of International Economic Law July 2, 2008), online at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1154601 (visited Oct 12, 2012).
19 Bassan, The Law of Sovereign Wealth Funds at 10 n 21 (cited in note 4).
20 Wharton Leadership Center, The Brave New World of Sovereign Wealth Funds 8, online at
knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/papers/download/052810_LauderSovereign-WealthFund-rep
ort_2010.pdf (visited Oct 12, 2012).
21 Andrew Rozanov, Who Holds the Wealth of Nations?, State Street Global Advisors (Aug 2005);
Diana Choyleva, Forget Sovemign Wealth Funds, QFINANCE, online at http://www.qfinance.com/
financing-best-practice/forget-sovereign-wealth-funds?full (visited Oct 12, 2012).
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the US-based Unocal Oil Company.2 2 While this was not a proposed investment
by an SWF, this and similar investments raised the profile of politically sensitive
sovereign investors and led to a demand for regulations that would extend to
SWFs. 23
Since 2005, twelve new SWFs have been established. 24 The establishment
of Chinese and Russian SWFs in 2007 increased concern that SWFs could
operate as political tools and heightened awareness of the new major players in
international capital markets.25 For example, the board of the CIC has significant
ties to the existing Chinese financial bureaucracy. Thus, the CIC investment
strategy takes into account the political goals of China's leadership, who have
expressed interest in embedding the Chinese government in Western financial
networks. This increases how much the CIC is willing to pay for the equity of
institutions like Morgan Stanley, Blackstone, Visa, and Barclays and allows them
to outbid other private investors.2 6 Concerns about these political motivations
are tempered in trying financial times when they provide a stabilizing force and
offer much-needed liquidity to foreign jurisdictions. 27 However, discussion of
SWF regulation remains salient, in part because the large size of SWF assets
makes them difficult to ignore: SWFs have grown to control $2 trillion, which
may rise to $12 trillion by 2015.28
B. The Modern Conceptualization and International
Definition of SWFs
The diversity of SWFs makes any definition difficult to arrive at and
complex, but a definition is necessary for international bodies to conceive a
22 Bart De Meester, InternationallegalAspects of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Reconciling InternationalEconomic
Law and the Law of State Immunities with a New Role of the State, *8 n 29 (Institute for International
Law, University of Leuven, Working Paper No 20, Jan 2009), online at
http://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/onderzoek/wp/WP130e.pdf (visited Oct 30, 2012).
23 Murray, SWF ::Myths and Realies at 5-6 (cited in note 12).
24 Audit, Baiers Against Foreign Sovereign Wealth Funds at 1 (cited in note 18).
25 Joseph J. Norton, The "Santiago Prinailes" and the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds:
Evolving Components of the New Bretton Woods II Post-Global Financial Crisis Architectre and Another
Example ofAd Hoc Global Administrative Networking and Related "Soft" Rulemaking?, 29 Rev Bank &
Fin L 465, 465-66 (Spring 2010).
26 Fleischer, 84 NYU L Rev at 443, 509 (cited in note 8).
27 Efraim Chalamish, Protectionism and Sovereign Investment Post Global Recession, OECD Global Forum
on International Investment 5 (Dec 2009); see also Interview with Knowledge@Wharton, The
Brave New World of Sovereign Wealth Funds (May 26, 2010), online at
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2499&source=rss (visited Oct 12,
2012).
28 Steven Scholes and Matthew Diller, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Regulatog and Ligation Issues in the
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harmonious set of standards. Some agencies, like the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD), have shied away from defining SWFs
at all.29 Another potential approach is not to treat SWFs as a single group of
investors but rather to try to single out different kinds of investments in need of
regulation. However, it will be useful for the purposes of this Comment to
understand how the term is and may in the future be used in an international
context. If nothing else, the government ownership of SWFs poses uniform and
unique issues of jurisdiction.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has defined SWFs as "investment
funds operated by governments to achieve various objectives, created by
allocating funds intended for long-term investments."3 0 This definition identifies
three important commonalities among SWFs: government ownership and
operation, creation through the allocation of government funds, and
functionality as long-term investments. This definition has been supplemented
and is reiterated by the first appendix to the Santiago Principles. This side-
project of the IMF, drafted by the SWFs themselves, defined SWFs as:
[S]pecial purpose investment funds or arrangements, owned by the general
government. Created by the general government for macroeconomic
purposes, SWFs hold, manage, or administer assets to achieve financial
objectives, and employ a set of investment strategies, which include
investing in foreign financial assets. The SWFs are commonly established
out of balance of payments surpluses, official foreign currency operations,
the proceeds of privatizations, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts resulting
from commodity exports. 31
The first definition is functional and concise, at the cost of being overbroad. It is
not clear whether the IMF definition includes government pension funds, for
example. The second is much more narrow, requiring that SWFs seek to achieve
macroeconomic purposes and invest in foreign financial assets. However, this
might exclude smaller funds like the Alaska Permanent Fund.
For the purposes of promoting uniform treatment of SWFs, a better
definition might be "funds established, owned and operated by local or central
governments, [whose] investment strategies include the acquisition of equity
interest in companies listed in international markets operating in sectors
considered strategic by their countries of incorporation."3 2 Fabio Bassan adopts
29 Bassan, The Law ofSovereign Wealth Funds at 26 (cited in note 4).
30 Id, citing Monetary and Capital Markets and Policy Development and Review Departments of the
International Monetary Fund, Sovereign Wealth Funds-A Work Agenda, IMF (Feb 29, 2008) online
at http://www.irnf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/022908.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2012).
31 International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Generally Accepted
Prinples and Practices: "Santiago Prinriples" 27 (Oct 2008).
32 Bassan, The Lal of Sovereign Wealth Funds at 32 (cited in note 4).
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this definition of SWFs in order to cover a variety of government-operated
funds, and to exclude innocuous funds that would not fall under international
regulation. His definition also allows for some flexibility of states to specify the
strategic investments the state would like to regulate. However, in the context of
international arbitration, the requirement of operating in strategic sectors should
be abandoned. All SWFs should have access to dispute resolution mechanisms
regardless of the sector in which they invest, because enforceable claims may
arise in all sectors and all SWFs pose questions of jurisdiction that can be
uniformly addressed. Thus, for purposes of this Comment, I will define SWFs as
"funds established, owned and operated by local or central governments,
[whose] investment strategies include the acquisition of equity interest in
companies listed in international markets.""
The IMF has also provided a classification of SWFs into: stabilization
funds, savings funds, and reserve investment companies. Stabilization funds are
used by countries with revenue from natural resources and agriculture to help
neutralize price fluctuations. Savings funds are established primarily to diversify
revenue from non-renewable sources into a variety of assets to minimize risk
and promote longevity. Finally, reserve investment companies are often the least
transparent and are used to reduce the costs of maintaining foreign reserves.3
These classifications are helpful to provide a glimpse of the diversity of SWFs,
but should not be treated as the basis for different treatment in international
arbitration. However, these different kinds of funds do pose different levels of
risk to host states, which are likely to be more lenient on commercially-minded
stabilization funds and more apprehensive about the potential misuse of reserve
investment companies, which may follow political goals and take money away
from domestic development in countries plagued by corruption, like Nigeria.35
Another commonality between SWFs is their general reluctance to disclose
financial information voluntarily.36 SWFs are likely to be hostile to restrictive,
taxing or information-seeking regulation, which could add extra hurdles to
investment and infringe on their sovereignty. And though they tend to be
clandestine investors, solely owned and operated by individual states whose
business dealings are not public knowledge, SWFs have organized in
international bodies such as the International Working Group of SWFs (IWG)
and the International Forum of SWFs (IFSWF) to contribute to the debate on
33 Id.
34 Id at 26-28.
35 Fleischer, 84 NYU L Rev at 493-94 (cited in note 8).
36 Epstein and Rose, 76 U Chi L Rev at 117-18 (cited in note 5).
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the appropriate standards for SWF investment.3 7 Historically, SWFs have been
cautious in their investments to avoid running up against regulation and
investment has only recently significantly increased. Now with an influx in assets
and coalescing sides to an international debate on regulation there is a significant
opportunity for international disputes with these newly defined investors to
arise. SWFs have branched out from treasury bonds to investments in industry
and resemble private investors more and more (though they carry the added risk
of political motives)." However, given SWFs' long-standing adversity to
disclosing information, reacting to this increase in investment with regulation is
sure to dampen growth.
C. The Santiago Principles
In an attempt to better define SWFs and circumvent stricter regulation, the
SWFs drafted a set of voluntary protocols-the Santiago Principles. The IWG,
composed of twenty-six member countries with SWFs, met on three occasions
to draft a set of twenty-four voluntary Generally Accepted Practices and
Principles, known as the "Santiago Principles." The working group relied on an
IMF survey of SWF current practices and drew from accepted international
practices to develop the principles, which were agreed on in Santiago, Chile, in
September 2008." These were made public in October 2008, in order to calm
state regulator fears. 0 The IWG has identified four guiding objectives that
underlie the Santiago Principles:
(1) To help maintain a stable global financial system and free
flow of capital and investment;
(2) To comply with all applicable regulatory and disclosure
requirements in countries in which they invest;
(3) To invest on the basis of economic and financial risk and
return-related considerations; and
3 Id at 121; Larry Cata Bakcer, Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis: Global Regulation of Sovereign Wealth
Funds, State-Owned Enterprises, and the Chinese Experience, 19 Transnatl L & Contemp Probs 3, 108 n
477 (2010).
38 Fleischer, 84 NYU L Rev at 454 (cited in note 8).
39 International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds Sub-Committee 1, IFSWF Members'Experiences in
the Application of the Santiago Princples, *11 (IFSWF July 7, 2011), online at www.ifswf.org/
pst/stp07071Lpdf (visited Oct 12, 2012).
40 Seth Robert Lindberg, Sovereign Wealth Fund Regulation in the E. U. and U.S.: A Callfor Workable and
Unform Soveretgn Wealth Fund Review within the E.U., 37 Syracuse J Intl L & Comm 95, 113-14
(2009).
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(4) To have in place a transparent and sound governance
structure that provides for adequate operational controls, risk
management, and accountability.4'
As of July 2011, 95 percent (out of 426 responses) of members of the
IFSWF reported that their practices were fully or partially consistent with the
Santiago Principles. 42  The Santiago Principles seek "to increase the
understanding of SWFs and their operations," and "ha[ve] led to greater
transparency, which has been welcomed."43 The more transparent SWFs are in
their investments the less likely they are to be political, or at least the more easily
political motivations can be identified. Transparency allows constituencies access
to investment decisions so they can more effectively demand investments for
profit to increase the country's wealth rather than for the pursuit of political
goals that might only benefit the political elite. The guiding objectives also
expressly commit SWFs to invest on economic and financial bases alone. Thus,
the Santiago Principles can go a long way in depoliticizing SWFs.
However, critics are still skeptical that states will comply with the voluntary
system of the Santiago Principles, because SWF investment is a self-interested
and opaque endeavor. If a majority of states endorse and follow the Santiago
Principles there is likely to be compliance across the board. However, "a distinct
possibility exists that, without overwhelming state SWF compliance, the Santiago
Principles will become nothing more than recommendations."" The only
current enforcement mechanism of the Santiago Principles is a fear of
reputational effects.
The Santiago Principles are not yet strictly enforced by host states or
comprehensive in scope and do not offer SWFs a mechanism to bring a claim
against a host state. They are ineffective for those who still seek redress through
arbitration. One hope for the Santiago Principles is that they may be integrated
into and enforced through the common law of international investment law by
the establishment of precedent through centralized bodies like ICSID. They
have supplied the basis for opinio juris and, given reported compliance,
adherence may be viewed as customary. Where there is no explicit choice of law
agreement between the parties ICSID tribunals are authorized under Article 42
of the ICSID Convention to apply rules of customary international law, and
have frequently applied these rules in areas such as compensation, prohibition of
41 IFSWF, IFSWF Members' Experiences in the Applicaion of the Sandiago Prindples at 12 (cited in note
39).
42 Id at 6 (only 15 percent of these consistent practices post-date issuance of the Santiago
Principles).
43 Id at 8.
44 Lindberg, Sovereign Wealth Fund Regulation in the E. U. and U.S. at 116-18 (cited in note 40).
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denial of justice and state responsibility for injury to aliens.45 So, while the
Santiago Principles offer some hope for depoliticizing SWFs, litigators should be
wary that they provide self-executing enforcement in the context of international
arbitration. Their most encouraging application would be implementation in
international arbitration.
D. An Overview of International Investment Law Applicable
to SWFs
The growing web of international investment regulation applied to SWFs
includes bilateral investment treaties (BITs), WTO agreements, and national
open market policies.' These mechanisms do not treat SWFs differently from
other international investors, neither privileging nor disadvantaging their
investments. However, they could be used to encourage more sovereign
investors or to regulate political investment.
1. The growth of BITs and their depoliticization of SWFs
The first BIT was signed in 1959 between Germany and Pakistan and made
inroads as the first international agreement exclusively focusing on the treatment
of foreign investments.47 BITs continue to expand in scope to cover other trade,
intellectual property, and industrial policy issues as well as specifying dispute
settlement procedures.48 BITs are most valuable in industrial investments, since
financial investments are "guaranteed by sound international regulations." 4 9 In
fact, the lack of BITs between the US and SWF home states might also explain
why there are few SWF industrial investments in the US. 0 But as SWF
investment grows in industry, which it likely will continue to as the global
economic crisis ebbs and there is pushback to foreign investment in the financial
sector," BITs and their arbitration provisions are increasingly important.
BITs principally provide protection standards between nations that can be
enforced in a variety of investor-state arbitral tribunals, thus giving SWFs access
45 Christoph H. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary 606 (Cambridge 2d ed 2009).
46 Chalamish, Protectionism and Sovereign Investment at 9-10 (cited in note 27).
47 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Bilateral Investment Treaties
1995-2006: Trends in Investment Ruemaking 1 (2007), online at http://www.unctad.org/
en/docs/iteiia20065_en.pdf (visited Oct 12, 2012).
48 Id.
9 Bassan, The Law of Sovereign Wealth Funds at 149 (cited in note 4).
50 Id.
s' Sven Behrendt, Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Saniago Principles: Where Do They Stand? *14-15
(Carnegie Papers No 22, May 2010).
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to dispute resolution mechanisms.5 2 These standards often include most favored
nation clauses, providing that a nation will not treat foreign investors and
investments less favorably than their own investors or than any other state's
investors. 53 BITs also protect investors from arbitrary or discriminatory
treatment.5 4 If these provisions are extended to cover SWF investments (which
they may already), they could ensure that an SWF cannot use its political
leverage to benefit its investments. For example, it would be a violation of the
BIT provisions for a government to bail out a company because an SWF
investor in that company threatened a deterioration of other diplomatic relations
with the government otherwise. This would be discriminatory treatment of
private investors without political ties. BITs could also protect SWFs from host
states regulating or disfavoring SWF investments in order to sanction their
sovereign owners by giving SWFs recourse for differential treatment.
BITs allow customization of complex investment law provisions giving
countries flexibility to tailor their standards to the unique concerns raised by
each potential investor or to promote particular industries. Thus, different SWFs
posing different political risks could be subject to different disclosure
obligations, or as an alternative, each BIT could contain uniform language
requiring transparency and fair dealing. States have so far been willing to pay the
transaction costs associated with customized BITs, as evidenced by the surge in
treaties that have been reached, numbering almost 2,500 by 2005." Therefore,
this is an attractive alternative to domestic regulation.
BITs are likely to remain one of the primary tools for international
investment because they include effective enforcement and dispute resolution
provisions. These frequently take the form of arbitration provisions designating
fora for investment disputes such as ICSID." In fact, "[tihe majority of BITs
have continued with the traditional approach of only sketching out the main
features of the investor-State dispute settlement mechanisms, relying on other
arbitration conventions to deal with specific procedural aspects."" This
52 Id at 7.
53 Claudia Annacker, Protection and Admission of Sovereign Investment under Investment Treaties, 10 Chinese J
Intl L 531, 546-47 (2011).
54 Audit, Bamiers Against Foreign Soverign Wealth Funds at 7-8 (cited in note 18).
55 Fleischer, 84 NYU L Rev at 485 n 173 (cited in note 8) ("Th[is] [] concern came to fruition in July
2008. . . when the Treasury announced a bailout plan for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. China is
the largest holder of debt in both companies. The administration's desire to cultivate good
relations with China could have affected its decision to bail out the mortgage companies.").
56 UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties at 1 (cited in note 47).
s7 See, for example, Itera International Eneqy LLC and Itera Group NV v Georgia, ICSID Case No
ARB/08/7, 5 (Dec 4, 2009).
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delegation of dispute resolution to a well-established third party reduces the
costs of negotiation and promotes uniformity and the establishment of
precedent for international investment. It is this added layer of enforceability
that could give bite to an SWF's commitment to pursue economic rather than
political goals.
The Santiago Principles could also be codified in BITs. Including
references to international law (like the Santiago Principles) in the choice of law
provisions of BITs would ensure compliance with international investment
standards. Backed up by an international arbitration regime willing to enforce
the terms of these BITs, this poses the strongest and most immediate option for
depoliticizing SWFs. The uncertainty of domestic regulation of SWFs, makes
internationalizing BITs "a more realistic way to protect the investors' interests
against the vagaries of the host State's law."s" This would also extend the
benefits of additional transparency and codify a commitment to invest based on
economic considerations alone.
Given the rise of SWFs and BITs, states should be careful in drafting BITs
to ensure the parties delineate where SWFs fall within their scope. BITs
generally have different arbitration provisions for state-state and investor-state
disputes, so the classification of SWFs as states or investors will impact their
potential remedies.o Classification of SWFs as states is intuitive, since they are
state-owned. This classification would also facilitate international arbitration with
nationals of contracting states (though this is not likely to be a common
phenomenon because of the resource constraints of individual nationals
compared to states). However, if SWFs are seen as states, arbitration on the
basis of terms of a BIT with other states is precluded in ICSID, which only
accepts jurisdiction over investor-state disputes." Disputes between states are
generally taken to the International Court of Justice or the Permanent Court of
Arbitration.62 Furthermore, the common BIT "state-state disputes provision
potentially has a narrower scope of application than the investor-state disputes
provision," because it applies only to disputes concerning the interpretation or
application of the BIT rather than any dispute concerning an investment." Only
one state-state dispute has ever been brought under a BIT, the rest having been
5 Schreuer, The ICSID Convention at 560 (cited in note 45).
60 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaies: History, Pogy, and Interpretaion 499 (Oxford
2010).
61 See Schreuer, The ICSID Convention at 160 (cited in note 45).
62 Id.
63 Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties at 499 (cited in note 60).
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settled in negotiation, with local remedies or submitted to investor-state
arbitration.'
On the other hand, if SWFs are seen as investors, or "national[s] of
another contracting state" they will be able to invoke arbitration with other
states under ICSID." Just as "state-owned entities can legitimately claim a
violation of the BIT; the same should be true for SWFs."" Therefore, the
drafters of BITs should include SWFs in their definition of investor and exclude
them from the category of a state. This will avoid the creation of a unique
system of regulation to deal with SWFs and permit the maximum amount of
international arbitration of SWFs in a forum focused on investment disputes,
which will help to establish international precedent in regulation and commit
SWFs to the same rules as other private international investors, rather than
defining them by their sovereign owners alone. Several investment treaties
already define investors to include state entities such as US, Canadian and
Australian BITs."
BITs still have clear drawbacks as a solution to investment regulation. By
and large BITs are uniform, but formally their common standards have not
coalesced into binding foreign investment law." Thus, they have weak
precedential value and tenuous acceptance. Their potential to establish a stable,
long-term solution to regulating SWF investment behavior is limited. In
addition, each BIT requires renewed negotiations between each different pair of
sovereignties looking to enforce international investment standards. BITs may
also run into complications with other agreements.
However, if implementation of the Santiago Principles continues
voluntarily, the prospect of domestic or international regulation of SWFs
decreases. As a result, fewer disputes arising out of unfavorable treatment of
SWFs will reach arbitration tribunals and the debate over regulating SWF
investments would be unnecessary. As of yet, the conversation about SWF
regulation has not disappeared and there is continued skepticism about the
adequacy of the Santiago Principles. Therefore, BITs may still play a role in
depoliticizing SWFs.
2. A role for the WTO
There is no WTO treaty that explicitly regulates international investment.
However, there are a few that may be applicable to SWFs. The General
64 Id at 507.
65 Schreuer, The ICSID Convention at 160 (cited in note 45).
66 Bassan, The Law of Sovereign Wlealth Funds at 143 (cited in note 4).
67 Annacker, 10 Chinese J Intl L at 537 (cited in note 53).
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Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)" contains anti-discrimination standards
for investments in services. While a minority investment does not trigger GATS
protection, a WTO member cannot block a majority investment by an SWF by
favoring a local investor. 0 GATS does not provide a broad basis for litigation
pursuant to SWFs or a dispute resolution mechanism, but could be the source of
a claim in international arbitration. Applying GATS to SWFs would level the
playing field with other investors and prevent host states from politically
retaliating against a country by denying SWF investments. This is an important
aspect of liberating SWFs from becoming political battlefields.
The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs)7' is also a
source of international law governing SWFs. TRIMs prohibits performance
requirements favoring domestic enterprise or restricting the quantity of imported
products.72 However, TRIMs does not directly address SWFs or protect their
investments from unfair or nationalistic intervention.7 ' In addition, BITs
increasingly include their own prohibition of performance requirements going
beyond the obligations of TRIMs.74 Therefore, TRIMs is unlikely to be the basis
of effective regulation of SWFs, but reinforces treatment of SWFs as any other
private investor.
Finally, the WTO offers the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) arbitration rules, which can be adopted in BITs as an
alternative to ICSID arbitration.7 ' Thus, SWFs could end up subject to ad hoc
arbitration tribunals set up according to UNCITRAL rather than ICSID
provisions. However, these ad hoc tribunals are inferior to ICSID arbitration.
Ad hoc tribunals require more work by the parties to the dispute and are less
assured to provide a binding solution. ICSID provides a secretariat to administer
arbitration while UNCITRAL does not. ICSID has no judicial review, while
UNCITRAL arbitrations can be reviewed in two jurisdictions. Allowing any
state where judgment is sought to be enforced to review an arbitration decision
69 1869 UNTS 183.
70 Chalamish, Protectionism and Sovereign Investment at 7 (cited in note 27).
71 Reprinted in Uruguay Round Trade Agreement, Statement of Administrative Action 1, art 9, HR
Doc 316, 103d Cong, 1448 (1994).
72 UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties at 78 (cited in note 47).
7 Yvonne C.L. Lee, The Governance of Contemporary Sovereign Wealth Funds, 6 Hastings Bus L J 197, 214
(Winter 2010).
74 UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaty at xii (cited in note 47).
7 See, for example, UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, General Assembly Res No 31/98,
UN Doc A/RES/31/17 (1976).
76 Daniel M. Price, Foreign Investment Protection under International Treaties, Research Institute of
Economy, Trade & Industry, IAA (transcript) (July 6, 2006), online at http://www.rieti.go.jp/
en/events/bbl/06070601.htmi (visited Oct 12, 2012).
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conducted under UNCITRAL adds an element of uncertainty to the arbitration,
and thereby an additional cost, that might defer claimants from pursuing
arbitration. The absence of judicial review under ICSID arbitration limits the
length and cost of arbitration by ensuring that the parties will be bound by a
judgment. The more open-ended UNCITRAL rules also allow more
opportunities for broader political fights to seep into an investment arbitration.
The WTO plays a quite limited role in new regulation and arbitration of
SWFs, but application of its existing international law gives support to the
depoliticization of SWFs by treating them like any other commercially-minded
investor and not equating them with their sovereign owners.
3. Progressing domestic law regimes
An understanding of the domestic laws that may affect SWFs has
significant implications for international arbitration because domestic laws that
treat SWFs differently from other investors or the use of domestic law to
penalize SWFs are subject to claims brought under BITs or WTO treaties in
international arbitration. The US "has long been open and receptive toward
foreign investment," and there are no federal laws that specifically target SWF
investments in the US. 7 SWFs are, however, subject to regulations that cover
foreign investments more broadly and critics have led the push for additional
regulation of SWFs because of their concerns for national security and
competing political motives. Additional regulation could have the opposite
effect-allowing SWF investments to become a place where political battles are
fought through the imposition of sanctions or subsidies of their investments.
For example, currently the US and UK tax systems subsidize SWFs because they
equate them with their sovereign owners and often do not impose on them the
same taxes as private foreign investors in order to respect their sovereignty.78
Thus, SWF investments become a statement about recognizing and respecting
sovereignty rather than contributions to a capital market that ought to be
exclusively profit-driven. Further distortions of the market would only allow for
additional political debates and make Trojan horse investments easier to disguise
(an SWF could claim it was paying a premium because of the tax benefit rather
than because of its true political motive).
As a result of domestic regulations sensitive to foreign investment, SWFs
have also avoided control over US investment opportunities. Regulations of the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) prohibit
77 US Government Accountability Office, Sove ign Wealth Funds: Laws Limiting Foregn InvestmeniAfect
Certain U.S. Assets and Agencies Have Vanous Enforcement Processes, Report to the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, US Senate GAO-09-608 8-11 (May 2009).
78 Fleischer, 84 NYU L Rev at 449, 469-70 (cited in note 8).
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control of nuclear assets and airlines and bring all transactions that result in
control by a foreign investor under review by the agency if there is a possible
impairment to national security." Between its inception in 1975 and 2006,
CFIUS reviewed over 1,600 cases of foreign acquisitions. 0 The Foreign
Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA) added new requirements
to CFIUS regulations." FINSA gives the president the power to block
investment transactions that threaten US national security.8 2 This broad
discretion could be subject to abuse, unjustly blocking SWF investments.
Ultimately, "a national decision canceling a SWF investment could be challenged
before an ICSID arbitration tribunal."" While a host state is entitled to protect
its national security, SWFs should be treated as any other foreign investor and
rather than increase domestic investigations into their investments (which will
raise diplomatic obstacles), there should be more international pressure for
transparency, as through the enforcement of the Santiago Principles. CFIUS
review should apply equally but no more stringently to SWF investors.
Since SWFs have avoided control, this also makes domestic investigation
less likely and their investments often pass under the radar (for example, they
avoid becoming a majority stakeholder subject to GATS). To expose SWF
misbehavior in these more discrete investments, host states should have easy
access to an international forum for dispute resolution. Creating international
precedent for this kind of action would also then serve to establish global
standards so that a country does not have to risk driving SWF capital out of its
own market and into another while trying to protect its national security.
There are a number of other US laws that affect SWF investments." The
scope and breadth of US regulation is an indication that any comprehensive
international regime would require a great deal of negotiation to cover the same
7 Spencer J.W. Willig, Sovereign Wealth Funds and U.S. Law: Strategies for Navigating the Regulatory and
Legal Landscape *3-4 (unpublished Masters Research Paper, The Lauder Institute, University of
Pennsylvania, Apr 2010), online at lauder.wharton.upenn.edu/pages/pdf/other/Willig.pdf (visited
Oct 12, 2012).
so Anthony Wong, Note, Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Pblem of Aymmetic Information: The Santiago
Painables and International Regulations, 34 Brooklyn J Intl L 1081, 1089 (2009).
81 Willig, Sovereign Wealth Funds and U.S. Iaw at 4 (cited in note 79).
82 50 USC App § 2170(d) (2007).
83 Audit, Bamers Against Foreign Sovereign Wealth Funds at 10 (cited in note 18).
8 SWF investments in financial firms are also subject to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956
and the Change in Bank Control Act. Rose, Sovergn Wealth Funds at 105 (cited in note 6). SWFs
must also comply with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act.
Wong, 34 Brooklyn J Intl L at 1090 (cited in note 80). In addition, SWFs must file proper
disclosures with the Securities and Exchange Commission and mergers and acquisitions by SWFs
face review by the Federal Trade Commission or the Department of Justice for potential antitrust
issues. US Government Accountability Office, Sovereign Wealth Funds at 14 (cited in note 77).
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ground and suggests that disputes involving SWFs in international arbitration
may be only a small subset of the disputes SWFs will face. Litigation under
domestic regulations will likely arise in domestic courts, which will be explored
in more detail in Section V. However, international bodies often take cues from
domestic regulation and will apply domestic law if the parties have consented to
adhere to the laws of a certain state. Domestic law still has a role to play, but
international forums are necessary to fill in the gaps.
This intricate web of domestic law provides motivation for SWFs and
sovereignties to opt out of the default system and continue employing BITs and
selecting forums for their disputes on a more particularized, individual basis. The
current uncertainty of domestic regulation also emphasizes the importance of
establishing precedent in international arbitration proceedings to promote
predictability and efficiency in investment.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF
INVESTMENT DISPUTES
A. Origin and Jurisdiction
ICSID was established by the World Bank Group in 1966 to stimulate
international capital investment in its member countries, thus facilitating poverty
reduction." The World Bank's concern was that investments in developing
countries were stagnating because investors did not trust developing countries'
domestic court systems. ICSID was set up by the Convention on the Settlement
of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States and is
seated in Washington, DC to serve as a neutral arbiter between states and
investors." As of July 25, 2012, 158 states have signed the Convention.'
The ICSID Convention set up an arbitration forum subject to rules for
selecting arbiters and compelling arbitration where the parties have executed
valid consent." Recently, parties have begun including arbitration provisions
designating ICSID in BITs rather than individual investment contracts, covering
85 Funke Aboyade, Why International Investment Disputes Are On the Rise, AllAfrica.com (Jan 9, 2007),
online at http://allafrica.com/stories/200701090092.html (visited Oct 18, 2012).
86 Ved P. Nnada and David K. Pansius, Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards Under the New York
Convention, 3 Lit Intl Disputes in US Cts § 19:37.
87 ICSID, List of Contracting States and Other Signatonies of the Convention (July 25, 2012), online at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServiet?requestType=1CSIDDocRH&actionVal=Contr
actingStates&ReqFrom=Main (visited Oct 12, 2012).
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a larger number of transactions." Thus, ICSID has gained in popularity as an
arbitration forum and has seen a dramatic increase in the number of filings.'0
Jurisdiction under ICSID is subject to three requirements. First,
jurisdiction "extend[s] to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment."
Next, this dispute must be "between a Contracting State (or any constituent
subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that
State) and a national of another Contracting State." Finally, the Convention
requires "the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre.""
The first requirement does not pose a significant restriction. An "investment" is
left to the parties to define as broadly or as narrowly as they wish to subject to
ICSID jurisdiction. 2  The requirement that the dispute arise between a
contracting state and a national of another contracting state does limit the claims
ICSID will hear and raises the same issues as BITs discussed above with respect
to categorizing SWFs. Whether a party is a state or a national determines
whether they may file a claim at all. Finally, because of the requirement of
consent, the vast majority of cases brought before ICSID arise out of BITs with
arbitration provisions, but some also arise out of multilateral agreements like the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)9'3 or Dominican Republic-
Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR).9' These prior agreements
constituting consent are essential, as Mariime International Nominees Establishment v
The Republic of Guineas established that absent execution of valid consent to
arbitration, US courts are powerless to compel ICSID arbitration."
89 Id.
90 Arif Hyder Ali and Alexandre de Gramont, ICSID Arbitration in the Americas in Global Arbitration
Review, TheArbitration Review oftheAmericas 6, 6 (2008).
91 ICSID, Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, Ch
2 Art 25 18 (Apr 2006).
92 See Schreuer, The ICSID Convention at 116 (cited in note 45). However, the term "investment" is
not unbounded, as an ICSID tribunal made clear in Zhinvak Development Lid v Republic of Georgia,
ICSID Case No. ARB/00/1, which held that "investment" is a limited category that does not
include development costs. Juliet Blanch, ICSID Landmark Rulng, The Lawyer (Apr 7, 2003),
online at http://www.thelawyer.com/icsid-landmark-ruling/78270.article (visited Oct 30, 2012).
93 32 ILM 605 (1993).
94 43 ILM 514 (2004); Ali and de Gramont, ICSID Arbitration in the Americas at 6 (cited in note 90).
9s 693 F2d 1094 (DC Cir 1982).
96 Frank W. Swacker, Kenneth R. Redden, and Larry B. Wenger, The World Trade Organiation and
Dispute Resolution, Disp Resol J 35, 86-87 (2000).
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B. ICSID's Current Function in Administering International
Arbitration
In 2011, ICSID registered 32 new cases and oversaw 159 ongoing cases.9
Claims filed with ICSID allow countries to enforce BITs and multilateral
investment treaties and can even be brought on the basis of domestic
investment law. Recently, more cases are being brought to ICSID involving
investors from developing nations against developed contracting states.98
There is some suggestion that ICSID arbitration may be on the decline.
Bolivia withdrew from ICSID in 2007, while Ecuador denounced the
Convention, effective January 2010.9' Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, too,
is considering withdrawal from ICSID "probably because if Venezuela loses all
of the 18 pending cases it has there ... it might have to shell out more than
$40bn."1'" Despite this decline in contracting states, "the number of arbitrations
filed under NAFTA and other treaties against governments in the northern part
of the hemisphere are increasing."o' Withdrawing from ICSID would risk
"future costs ... far greater than anything Venezuela might have to pay out as a
result of ICSID rulings."10 2 Although, even non-contracting states can take
advantage of ICSID's Additional Facility Rules.103 This enables any of the nine
countries with SWFs who are not parties to the ICSID Convention to still take
advantage of ICSID arbitration.'04
97 Meg Kinnear, ICSID Annual Report 2011, 25 (Sept 9, 2011), online at http://icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDPublicationsRH&actionVal=ViewAnnualReports#
(visited Oct 12, 2012).
98 Meg Kinnear, ICSID Annual Report 2010, 25 (une 30, 2010), online at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServiet?requestType=ICSIDPublicationsRH&actionVal
=ViewAnnualReports# (visited Oct 12,2012).
99 Patricia 1. Vasquez, Latin American Nations Unhappy with World Bank Arbitration Panel, 58 Oil Daily
92 (May 13, 2008); ICSID, Ecuador Submits a Notice underAricle 71 of the ICSID Convention (uly 9,
2009), online at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=
CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases
&pageName=Announcement20 (visited Oct 12, 2012).
10 Benedict Mander, Chavet Wants Out of ICSID (again), Financial Times (Sept 13, 2011).
101 Ali and de Gramont, ICSID Arbitration in the Americas at 8 (cited in note 90).
102 Mander, Chaver Wants Out ofICSID (again) (cited in note 100).
103 Schreuer, The ICSID Convention at 84 (cited in note 45).
104 Compare ICSID, Ust of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention (cited in note 87) with
SWF Institute, What is a SWF?: List of Sovereign Wealth Funds, online at
http://www.swfinstitute.org/what-is-a-swf/ (visited Oct 12, 2012). Angola, Brazil, Equitorial
Guinea, Hong Kong, Iran, Kiribati, Libya, Mexico, and Vietnam have SWFs but are not
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Latin American countries have raised concerns that ICSID is "beholden to
US interests" and infringes on developing countries' sovereignty. However, this
concern does not seem widely shared given the rise in the number of claims
brought by developing countries."o' In addition, Latin America "has not
historically developed as many SWFs as other regions have," so for the purposes
of SWF arbitration ICSID remains an attractive administrator.10
ICSID offers parties legitimacy, ease of administration, and binding
judgments. ICSID's fifty years of experience in arbitration and commitment to
the neutrality of its arbiters lend it credibility. ICSID allows for bias challenges
and maintains internal mechanisms to ensure the quality of its resolutions. 07
Administratively, ICSID allows countries to customize arbitration proceedings:
"Party autonomy allows the parties to modify the ICSID regulatory framework
to achieve the best possible framework for the arbitration."' International
arbitration under ICSID increases the likelihood of obtaining enforcement,
because an award must be recognized by each contracting state. 09 A national
court judgment, by contrast, might be limited to reaching the assets inside that
nation. ICSID maintains confidentiality both in procedure and in the resulting
award. 10
In addition, "ICSID has been considered the least expensive institution as
its fee is based on the actual cost that its subsidized staff incurs . . . [h]owever,
while less expensive than other institutions, this fee can be burdensome."' 11
Parties must pay all of ICSID's direct expenses attributable to the arbitration in
addition to an initial $25,000 fee to file an action and a $20,000 fee on an annual
basis after an arbitral tribunal is formed. 12
IV. SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES
SWFs and ICSID are a natural pairing-assisted by some of the largest
international players (the IMF and the World Bank) and committed to
105 Vasquez, Latin American Nations Unhappy (cited in note 99).
106 Wharton, The Brave New World of Sovereign Wealth Funds at 15 (cited in note 20).
107 Sam Luttrell, Bias Challenges in International CommernialArbitraion: The Need for a "Real Danger" Test
218 (Kluwer L Intl 2009).
108 Anoosha Boralessa, The Limitaions ofParyAutonom in ICSID Arbitradon, 15 Am Rev Intl Arb 253,
303 (2004).
109 Schreuer, The ICSID Convention at 1115 (cited in note 45).
110 Margaret L. Moses, The Princajles and Pratice of International Commercial Arbitration 3 (Cambridge
2008).
MI Boralessa, 15 Am Rev Intl Arb at 292 (cited in note 108).
112 Kinnear, ICSID Annual Report 2010 at 46 (cited in note 98).
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promoting the free flow of capital and investment, SWFs and ICSID are also
both protective of investors' confidentiality and focused on ensuring an
enforceable return. Promoting arbitration in ICSID disputes with SWFs will also
lend consistency to international investment expectations and could help
support SWFs as profit-driven investors and curtail their use as political tools.
BITs are likely to include increasingly similar provisions perhaps including new
provisions targeted at SWFs, or at investor transparency, which can be tested in
ICSID tribunals with predictable results. Consenting to ICSID arbitration will
thus imply a certain interpretation of investments and agreements reducing
ambiguity in contracting and taking advantage of precedent to lower information
costs when SWFs behave as ordinary investors.
A. Jurisdiction
ICSID should have jurisdiction over disputes arising with SWFs, though
this requires some interpretation of consent and the categorization of SWFs.
First, arbitration before ICSID requires the consent of both parties.
Traditionally, consent is given in BITs." 3 Ideally, all contracting states will
include provisions consenting to arbitration in their domestic investment
legislation, unilaterally submitting to ICSID.114 These provisions would remove
the gatekeeping function from states, insulating dispute resolution from state
preferences and power capabilities."' This solution might be attractive to states
in areas that typically end up in international arbitration because it provides
certainty to investors and states generally want to encourage investment.
Consent through legislation can be limited to certain specified issues and is even
revocable should the states choose to change their legislation."' But unilateral
submission would also remove one more political fight from the table and
reduce selective prosecution. Although there is a concern that this might result
in more frivolous suits, this is tempered by the expense of international
arbitration. Until there is sufficient international pressure for unilateral
submission, BITs can also be customized to submit any subset of investment
disputes to ICSID arbitration.
Assuming an SWF and a contracting state have consented to ICSID
arbitration, ICSID will only have jurisdiction if their dispute is classified as one
between a state and a foreign investor. ICSID was designed this way because it
113 Dolzer and Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties at 130 (cited in note 68). The first BIT including
consent to ICSID arbitration was signed in 1968 between the Netherlands and Indonesia.
14 Id at 131-32.
115 Robert 0. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, LegaliZed Dispute Resolution:
Interstate and Transnaional, 54 Ind Org 457, 488 (Summer 2000).
116 Schreuer, The ICSID Convention at 196 (cited in note 45).
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was assumed that disputes between two states would be sent to the International
Court of Justice or the Permanent Court of Arbitration and that disputes
between two individuals or corporations would be settled in domestic courts or
other commercial arbitration bodies."' If SWFs are designated as states then
they cannot bring disputes against other states and states cannot bring suits
against them. ICSID tribunals might be tempted to pierce the veil of SWFs and
identify them with their state owners, forgoing jurisdiction. However, there are a
number of advantages in designating SWFs as individuals besides retaining
jurisdiction, not the least of which is that seeing SWFs as individuals will
depoliticize them by allowing them to bring their own direct claims rather than
relying on their governments to do this for them (which would turn these
investment disputes into an opportunity for political strategizing). Recognizing
SWF individual status is an important step to encouraging states to separate
those who staff their SWFs from those in executive positions, allowing them to
step farther out of the sovereign's political shadow. Individual status would also
level the playing field with other private investors, who are subject to and can
bring claims against host states. If the goal of regulation is to make SWFs behave
more like normal investors, they should be exposed to and afforded the same
access to dispute resolution.
There are indications that disputes between contracting states and SWFs
will satisfy ICSID jurisdiction. Already "[t]he BITs ratified by the home states of
the major SWFs, in case of dispute between the investor and the other
contracting party, provide for the submission of the controversy to the ICSID
tribunal."" Scholars have projected that ICSID can provide a forum to resolve
controversies "arising from the breach of a BIT by a state that has prohibited or
conditioned an SWF's investment in a company incorporated in the same
state ... based on the specific provision of a BIT but (also) on international
customary law.""' However, this also indicates that individuals or corporations
will not be able to bring claims against SWFs in ICSID, because ICSID requires
at least one state party.12 0 Domestic forums might still be more appropriate for
these claims, as they would be for private investors.
Though some scholars postulate that "ICSID arbitration may not be
available to investor states themselves and their subdivisions even if they are
protected investors for purposes of an applicable investment treaty that provides
117 See, for example, id at 130.
118 Bassan, The Law of Sovereign Wealth Funds at 148 (cited in note 4).
119 Id at 81-82; Audit, Barriers Against Foreign Sovereign Wealth Funds at 10 (cited in note 18) ("[I]t is
quite likely that a ICSID arbitration tribunal would accept jurisdiction on a case founded on a BIT
and in which the claimant is a SWF.").
120 Schreuer, The ICSID Convention at 144 (cited in note 45).
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for ICSID arbitration," 21 there has not been an opportunity for an arbitral
tribunal to determine jurisdiction. 122 Negotiations leading up to the signing of
the ICSID Convention show that jurisdiction over investor states was not
expressly included because of concerns that inter-state arbitration would lead to
political difficulties.123 However, this Comment argues that giving SWFs access
to this arbitration will actually reduce political difficulties between states.
B. Benefits of ICSID for SWF Arbitration
ICSID arbitration provides a binding judgment that will let claimants reach
assets and ensure an enforceable victory in any contracting state's jurisdiction.
Guaranteed enforcement is a significant advantage over a domestic law
judgment against an SWF in a foreign jurisdiction, which may be difficult to
enforce. SWFs are routine players, so they are not likely to try to evade a
domestic judgment; nevertheless ICSID arbitration eliminates this concern and
another area of political contention. BITs often specify that arbitration awards
will be final and binding, but this is somewhat redundant since the ICSID
Convention makes any award enforceable in the territory of any contracting
state.' 24 The finality of ICSID judgments limits the review of domestic courts,
saving claimants the time and cost of a drawn-out enforcement proceeding.
Investment is likely to increase where potential investors and host states are
assured that any dispute that arises will result in a readily enforceable reward.
Host states do want to encourage the stabilizing investments and added liquidity
contributed by SWFs.
ICSID also provides for an internal annulment proceeding to offer a
measure of protection against iniquitous tribunals while maintaining insulation
from local law.'25 There may be a moral hazard concern that because there is not
a rigorous appeals process (there is no review of fact and law findings, only
remedies for due process type violations), that more frivolous suits will be
brought.'26 However, the monetary cost of ICSID arbitration and the
international publicity are sufficient to allay these concerns.
121 Annacker, 10 Chinese J Intl L at 554 (cited in note 53).
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More broadly, moving arbitration into the international sphere provides an
opportunity to create international precedent. It has been noted that in particular
the use of ICSID tribunals "contribute[s] significantly to the long-term
development of international investment law," and that they "have significant
potential for increasing their contribution."' 27 1This cohesion is valuable to
investors, states, and third parties by creating a predictable legal framework in a
diverse and largely neutral forum. SWFs should be particularly eager to take
advantage of this potential for cohesion because of the currently unpredictable
status of domestic regulation. Host states would also enjoy a measure of
predictability in SWF behavior, which would make unwelcome political behavior
easier to spot and eliminate.
Providing an international dispute resolution mechanism for SWFs might
also encourage a less cautious investment approach and counter the threat of
regulation that has led SWFs to limit their investments to minority holdings and
maintain broad portfolios."' States in which SWFs invest will be more cautious
in enacting regulations against SWFs for fear of challenges against them under
provisions of BITs. On the other hand, they may not need as rigorous of
domestic regulations to protect sensitive industries from misfeasance because
claims of this sort could be brought before ICSID. A shift to an international
system will thus spare those states the political capital it would take to pass
domestic regulations. This serves the dual purpose of increasing welcome
liquidity and depoliticizing SWFs by directing their investments to profit-driven
rather than distorted or political goals.
ICSID also offers parties confidentiality, which makes it an appealing
forum for those dealing with sensitive investment information. Since SWFs are
known for lacking transparency this is once again a natural pairing.
Confidentiality might further inhibit public scrutiny of SWFs, contributing to the
presumption that they operate under political motives, but may also be necessary
for consent to ICSID jurisdiction. If SWFs are going to further mollify calls to
regulate their investments, providing for open hearings before ICSID could be
one show of good faith. The ICSID Convention by default keeps deliberations
and hearings in investor-state arbitration private, but accommodates public
hearings, which have been agreed to in investment treaties.129 Keeping ICSID
hearings under wraps is also not beneficial for the development of international
precedent. Making awards and deliberations public would advance a more
127 Ole Kristian Fauchald, The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Trbunals-An EmpiricalAnaysis, 19 Eur J Ind
L 301, 358 (2008).
128 Brendan J. Reed, Note, Sovereign Wealth Funds: The New Barbarians At the Gate? An Analysis of the
Legal and Business Implications of TheirAscendang, 4 Va L & Bus Rev 97, 130 (Spring 2009).
129 Schreuer, The ICSID Convention at 698-99 (cited in note 45).
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predictable international regime and help depoliticize SWFs, but neither SWFs
nor host states are likely to have this as their foremost concern when it comes to
sensitive financial information. The benefit of ICSID arbitration is that its
flexible model provides for confidentiality or greater transparency depending on
the goals of the state and investor parties, but the drawback is that this might
conceal political motives. It might be left to BITs or the Santiago Principles to
ensure greater transparency rather than the dispute resolution process itself.
However, this is the same for private investors and at least bringing SWFs out
from the shadows of their state owners will level the playing field and can give
some force to diplomatic solutions arrived at in treaties.
A drawback of ICSID is that it is not likely to address many of the
tumultuous domestic law issues presented by SWFs. For example, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigations under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA)'o are unlikely to result in arbitration before an
ICSID tribunal, because the US would bring any resulting dispute before a
domestic court. The US will likely see its own court system as more favorable to
American regulation of investors and perhaps want to avoid the reputational
effects of being named as a respondent in international arbitration.' To the
extent that ICSID is estranged from these sovereign needs and priorities,
maintaining dispute resolution in both domestic and international forums strikes
an important balance. The traditional view of international arbitration is that it is
relegated to disputes between developed and developing countries because of a
lack of confidence in some domestic courts. ICSID may still be confined to
supplementing jurisdictions that lack capacity, but has room to expand to a
growing demand for international investment dispute resolution.
International arbitration might be more risky and costly than domestic
litigation for a state party because the arbitration can take place in a foreign
jurisdiction and interpretation of domestic law might be less predictable or less
biased in favor of the state. The US is less likely to initiate international
arbitration proceedings, but they have given ex ante consent to ICSID
arbitration in BITs and therefore must comply with demands for arbitration. For
example, the US negotiated a BIT containing an ICSID arbitration provision
with Kazakhstan, which operates the Kazakhstan National Fund, whose assets
are mostly in the state securities of the US.13 2 The Kazakhstan National Fund
130 15 USC §§ 78dd-1 et seq (2000).
131 Price, Foreign Investment Protection Under Intemadonal Treaties (cited in note 76).
132 The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning
the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment (1992), online at
http://tcc.export.gov/TradeAgreements/AllTradeAgreements/exp_005571.asp (visited Oct
12, 2012); Kagakhstan to Double National Fund's Assets in 2015, Interfax-Kazakhstan (Aug 27, 2011),
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could draw the US into ICSID arbitration under the provisions of this BIT,
despite an American preference for a national court. This concern has led some
states, like Norway, to call for an exhaustion of local remedies before resorting
to international arbitration.'33
However, SWFs would particularly benefit from an international rather
than domestic forum for dispute resolution even where domestic law is applied
because of the suspicion and skepticism they have faced in foreign jurisdictions
like the US. A tribunal decides each ICSID dispute "in accordance with such
rules of law as may be agreed by the parties" and "[i]n the absence of such
agreement ... shall apply the law of the contracting state party to the dispute . . .
and such rules of international law as may be applicable." 13 4 Thus, ICSID
arbitration has the capacity to interpret domestic laws or incorporate
international law. Through its neutral administration and selection process of
tribunals, ICSID could serve to insulate SWFs from some of the unfounded
prejudices (like assuming that SWF investments are more politically driven than
private investments) that are prevalent among domestic regimes while enforcing
domestic laws. ICSID jurisdiction and awards in favor of SWFs could serve to
increase the validity and legitimacy of SWF investments and entitlements.
Developing countries have raised concerns that ICSID has a bias in favor of
investors, but "the evidence is that investors do not fare better before ICSID
tribunals than they do before other tribunals.""' On the other hand, domestic
judicial systems are commonly subject to political interference.
ICSID has the potential to benefit host states and SWFs by providing a
level playing field for investor disputes, enforcing the provisions of BITs and
reducing the influence of domestic bias. Moving disputes with SWFs out of
domestic courts and into a standardized, neutral, international arena is one more
step toward depoliticizing how SWF investments are made and viewed.
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V. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS FOR
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS
A. Alternatives in International Arbitration
While the most common international arbitration forums are ICSID and
the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, a substantial minority of BITs specify
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.'3 1 Other options include the Court of
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris (the ICC
Court), the Arbitration Institute of the Chamber of Commerce of Stockholm
(the SCC) or ad hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL rules.' 3 8 The ICC Court
offers the assistance of a secretariat, procedures that are not tailored or limited
to investment disputes, and a mere $3,000 registration fee. Furthermore, their
awards are enforceable under the 1958 United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York
Convention).'39 However, the ICC Court's membership is much smaller-at
only 90 member countries'40-and its awards are much more vulnerable to
review. The New York Convention provides "a detailed list of grounds on
which recognition and enforcement may be refused," while ICSID judgments
must be treated "as if [they] were a final judgment of a court," and are not
subject to these exceptions. 141 The ICC offers an advantageous forum to claims
where neither party is a state, which might fill a gap in ICSID jurisdiction.
However, the ICC does not have comparable experience with state-investor
disputes, as only 10 percent of their cases involve claims where at least one party
is a state.142
The SCC also provides a secretariat and decisions are enforceable under
the New York Convention.'43 However, a majority of the SCC's cases are
Swedish and very few originate from investment protection treaties.144
137 Dolzer and Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties at 146 (cited in note 68).
138 UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treay 1995-2006 at 110 (cited in note 56).
139 International Chamber of Commerce, International Court of Arbitration: Dispute Resolution Senices,
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The UNCITRAL rules provide no administrative support for the
arbitration and are used for a wide variety of disputes. ICSID provides an
experienced secretariat, a large membership base, expert arbiters, relatively low
costs, and final judgments. Thus, ICSID still appears to be the most favored and
most experienced forum in international arbitration of investment disputes.
B. Possibilities for Policy
An option aside from arbitration or litigation is to pursue policy changes.
The OECD hosts an annual Freedom of Investment conference bringing
together some 50 governments to discuss investment policies.145 The OECD
also provides guidelines for international investment in the OECD Declaration
and Decisions on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises.146
SWF host states could seek to influence these OECD guidelines or to execute
formal treaties through the WTO to protect them from discriminatory treatment
rather than rely on BITs, which were not negotiated with SWFs in mind.
Another possibility would be to form a new international body to hear disputes
pertaining to SWFs. However, there is not currently the demand for such an
elaborate solution-as of yet no SWFs have even sought relief before ICSID or
other international arbitration bodies.
C. Domestic Law Approaches to SWF Disputes
Domestic law broadly offers an alternative to international dispute
resolution by confining claims to domestic courts and withholding consent from
international arbitration. The US in particular is likely to seek domestic solutions,
as it has been the site of "many vocal politicians and pundits warn[ing] of the
dangers SWFs pose to our capitalist system," though it is also home of
academics that defend them against additional domestic regimes and benefitted
in 2008 from SWF investments.'4 7 Thus, this Comment addresses the possible
alternatives America presents for SWF dispute resolution and why in many
instances an international solution is still preferable.
144 Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, SCC Continues to Soar, online at
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1. Domestic law solutions
Litigation involving SWFs in the US will likely fall into two different
categories: enforcement litigation and private civil litigation. Enforcement
litigation refers to actions taken by US regulatory authorities to enforce federal
or state securities laws. Civil litigation refers to general litigation in American
courts by private parties. Both types of litigation are unlikely to fall within the
international sphere, but they establish expectations of international investment
likely to influence SWF behavior worldwide.
Enforcement litigation may not offer international arbitration a role to
play. For example, beginning in January 2011, US financial institutions began
receiving inquiries from the SEC into whether they had violated the FCPA in
their dealings with SWFs.'48 The FCPA prohibits payments to government
officials (which includes officials affiliated with SWFs and SWF employees) in
order to influence their business decisions.149 Should the SEC or DOJ decide to
take action after its investigation of the financial investments of SWFs under the
FCPA, it is likely to choose a domestic forum. This is a better political choice
because a lawsuit in US courts is likely to bring more positive attention to the
government for holding actors involved in the financial crisis accountable.
Furthermore, domestic government agencies would likely be wary of
international interpretation of domestic regulations, choosing to rely instead on
the customs and procedures of domestic forums. Within the US it is well-
established that "a court will give great deference to an agency's interpretation of
its own rules."so It might also be a more practical economic choice. In fact, the
SEC might seek enforcement in the US "without any of the procedural
protections, transparency, or judicial review that exist in traditional civil
litigation.""' The SEC can sanction without offering a chance for dispute
resolution at all, thus maximizing efficiency in deterring misfeasance, though
contributing little substance to an international precedent.
There are also some instances of private civil litigation that are not
conducive to international arbitration. SWFs have recently been caught up in the
Bernard Madoff fraud. The Madoff trustee is seeking to recover $300 million
from the Abu Dhabi SWF in US Bankruptcy Court in Manhattan.' 52 jurisdiction
is predicated on the fact that the SWF purposely directed another fund to invest
148 Alan Brudner, Palmina Fava, and Mor Wetzler, FCPA and UK Bribey Act Risks Facing Financdal
Institutions, Ethisphere Q4, 58 (2010).
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money in New York and because it wired money through a New York bank."s'
A domestic forum is preferable when an SWF is entangled in a mass of litigation
like the Madoff fraud that is already before a national court. Seeking out
arbitration in an international forum would incur a huge expense when the
dispute involves domestic law issues that have already been initiated and
consolidated in a national court. On the other hand, an international forum
would avoid the precarious basis for jurisdiction and the potential that a US
court will not be able to compel enforcement.
Finally, domestic law options might also be compulsory under some BITs.
The Norwegian BIT model "contains a requirement regarding exhaustion of
national legal remedies . . . if the investor has not reached a settlement pursuant
to national law within three years, he can institute international dispute
settlement."154 Where an SWF or state seeks to bring a claim under a BIT with
this type of provision domestic courts are the first stop. However, it is notable
that even these provisions acknowledge that domestic law options may not be
sufficient for adequate dispute resolution-leaving open the potential for
international arbitration after the exhaustion of domestic resources.
2. Domestic law pitfalls
While domestic law options are appealing in enforcement and private civil
litigation cases and would largely treat SWFs just as any private investor, in cases
involving a question of treaties or international law, ICSID has a clear role to
play.
The application of domestic law tends to be a more political process than
international arbitration. "A foreign investor," particularly a controversial
investor like an SWF, "justifiably in many instances, will not have confidence in
the impartiality of the local tribunals and courts in settling any disputes that may
arise between him and the host state." 5 Allowing the parties to select their own
panelists on an ICSID tribunal helps to ensure that the arbitration will be judged
by a group of experts or those with the technical backgrounds necessary to
understand complex investment disputes rather than a randomly selected judge
or jury, which may rely instead on the biases of their home country. A politically
neutral process is helpful in depoliticizing the perception of SWFs.
In addition, resource constraints between the two parties can play less of a
role in international arbitration because discovery is often more limited. A
1s3 Id.
154 Bassan, The Law of Sovereign Wealth Funds at 136 (cited in note 4).
155 M. Sornarajah, International Law on Foreign Investment 250 (Cambridge 2d ed 2004). See also William
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briefer discovery period might raise the chances of overlooking a crucial piece of
evidence. However, this is counterbalanced by the availability in international
arbitration of expert panelists who may be able to conduct a more efficient
discovery process because of their extensive background knowledge. In
domestic litigation, settlement may be reached because of wealth effects rather
than because an ideal compromise has been struck. As opposed to American
litigation, international arbitration is widely considered less expensive."6
Among other weaknesses, domestic law options generally run into greater
enforcement obstacles. The debtor state's courts can refuse to enforce a ruling in
favor of an alien, or local enforcement may be rendered impracticable by
legislation, adverse precedent, or other barriers."' Where a domestic court
cannot compel enforcement, this may give rise to a new claim under
international law: "Specifically, such circumstances may constitute a 'denial of
justice,' or may otherwise be cognizable under an investment treaty, many of
which authorize investors to bring arbitration claims against host States.""'
Thus, in many instances domestic litigation will only circle back to international
arbitration for enforcement. This additional layer of procedure required in
domestic litigation provides even more impetus to bring claims before ICSID
tribunals in the first place.
Domestic dispute resolution also runs into greater issues of sovereignty,
which SWFs would like to avoid because these issues often conflate SWFs with
political motives. In the US, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)"'
presents an initial obstacle to bringing claims against SWFs. Under FSIA, foreign
government-owned entities are immune from suit in American courts. This
indicates that there may be instances where SWFs are immune from prosecution
in the US, but subject to a claim in ICSID. These instances will likely be rare.
There are exceptions to FSIA and "[w]hile SWFs appear by formal definition to
satisfy the criteria of a government-owned enterprise and thus [are] vested with
immunity, not all SWFs may be entitled to such protection."1 60 FSIA contains a
commercial activities exception that provides:
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[F]oreign states are not immune from jurisdiction in cases in which the
plaintiff's claims are based on commercial activity carried on in the United
States or an act performed in the United States in connection with a
commercial activity elsewhere, or an act in connection with a commercial
activity of a foreign state elsewhere that causes a direct effect in the United
States.'16
Though it is rare that an SWF will not fall within this exception, at a
minimum a domestic law solution will run into higher procedural costs in
determining jurisdiction than ICSID, which generally provides a clear-cut
determination of consent. Finally, even if the obstacle of jurisdiction is
overcome and US courts can hear a claim brought against the SWF, "[t]he FSIA
permits U.S. courts to execute judgments only against sovereign 'property in the
United States . .. used for a commercial activity in the United States."" 62 This
limitation on reachable assets contributes to the domestic law barrier to
enforcement. Raising these issues of special treatment for SWFs is a great pitfall
for domestic law.
Given the benefits and downfalls outlined above, in most instances ICSID
arbitration is a preferable forum for the settlement of international investment
disputes involving SWFs.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Comment has outlined the ways in which three important structures
in international law (SWFs, BITs, and ICSID) intersect and will continue to
influence investment and regulation. SWF investments and interests are
divergent, but are all subject to international investment laws, domestic law
regimes, and soft law like the Santiago Principles, seeking to coordinate and gain
acceptance for SWF investment as a commercial and apolitical pursuit. This new
category of investors with considerable assets and limited recognition in long-
standing international law deserves the scrutiny of international bodies to
determine how SWFs fall into existing regimes, especially now, since "SWFs
have been largely quiet investors, but that is likely to change in coming years.
SWFs with considerable investments in industrial assets in mature economies ...
will want a more active role in the design and execution of corporate
leadership."" With a more active role comes the potential for a rise in
investment suits, particularly where SWFs venture outside of financial
investments into more sensitive industries local governments will seek to
161 Willig, Sovereign Wealth Funds and US Law at 22, citing 28 USC § 1605(a)(2 ) (cited in note 79).
162 Id at 26, citing Connecicut Bank of Commerce v Repubic of Congo, 309 F3d 240, 247 (5th Cir 2002),
quoting 28 USC S1610(a)(1).
163 Behrendt, Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Saniago Prinnages at 15 (cited in note 51).
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regulate. There is no indication that SWFs are disappearing, rather they serve an
important government purpose to invest surplus and have demonstrated their
benefit in helping to stabilize the world economy in the recent financial crisis.
SWFs have already taken on an intricate legal structure implicating BITs
and ICSID. BITs are crucial for providing dispute resolution mechanisms for
SWFs because of their arbitration provisions and customization to suit the needs
of host states. As the primary means for governing foreign investment and
ensuring egalitarian treatment of investors, BITs will form the substantive basis
of the international law governing SWFs and are foundational in promoting
transparency and the disavowal of political motives. Finally, as the most popular
forum for the arbitration of international investment disputes, ICSID is a logical
and advantageous body for the resolution of claims brought by SWFs. It will
continue to issue binding judgments and establish international precedent.
There are alternatives to ensuring fair treatment of SWF investments.
There are alternative dispute resolution bodies and potential policy solutions.
There is also a call to synchronize standards through regulation, but domestic
law is often inadequate to ensure jurisdiction and enforcement and raises more
political issues than it solves. An international agency like ICSID provides a
relatively low-cost, customizable, and neutral forum for the necessary dispute
resolution arising out of the investments of SWFs. While this may necessitate an
increase in the number of BITs or state legislation consenting to ICSID
arbitration in SWF disputes, ultimately, reliance on international institutions for
dispute resolution will limit the influence of local politics and increase efficiency
in investment and negotiations by reducing the number of domestic regulations
that provide unique and complex obstacles, replacing them with a
comprehensive international standard.
Robust trade agreements designating an arbitration regime that establishes
precedent regarding acceptable practices offer a path to provide consistency and
protect against misfeasance. An international body for the resolution of SWF
disputes is one further step in a "better ordered system of International Law;
one to which the assent of civilized peoples may be given greatly to the benefit
and peace of mankind."16 4
164 Thomas Balch, International Courts ofArbitraion 27 (Philadelphia, Allen, Lane and Scott 1912).
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